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Abstract
In the process of deradicalization, the reintegration of former jihadist detainee places 
as the most dilemmatic agenda to conduct. It raises a problematic situation between 
the issue of security and restoring the former jihadist detainees’s human rights. 
But, the struggle in the reintegration process not only occurs to the state and host 
community but also to the former jihadist detainees itself.  This paper focuses on the 
story of former jihadist detainees in Solo region who have  different experiences in 
their reintegration process and their strategies to encounter the problem as an effort 
to erase the radical thinking and start a new life. Solo Region was chosen because it 
receives a 'stigmatization' as a cultivation region for religious radicalism because of 
its record on radical Muslim's web and figure such as Abubakar Baasyir (the founder 
of Islamic radical group namely Jemaah Islamiyah). It also becomes a growing place 
for Islamic radicalism groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah 
Islamiyah which contributed toward Makassar’s Cathedral bombing, Bali bombing 
I and II and Laskar Jihad and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia which tried to enforce 
Islamic value in Indonesia. The data of this research was gained by conducting an 
in-depth interview with four former jihadist detainees in Solo region who are willing 
to be interviewed under the pseudonym. Also, exposure some references as the 
secondary data. This article found that a sustainable, gradual, and comprehensive 
reintegration process in social, ideological, political, and economic aspects could 
support the effort of former jihadist detainees in the Solo region to establish a new 
life.
Keywords: Reintegration, Former Jihadist Detainees, Solo Region, The Cycle of 
Radicalism
Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion Volume 06 Number 02 December 2021
Website Journal : http://blasemarang.kemenag.go.id/journal/index.php/analisa
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18784/analisa.v6i02.1421
INTRODUCTION
The reintegration for former jihadist 
detainees is often challenging to implement 
because of persistent stigmatization against them. 
There is a fear among host communities that if 
they are returned, they will start a new threat 
to community stability. Society still believes 
that radical thinking that has been rooted it is 
impossible to disappear and potentially re-emerge 
in unpredictable times. This construction usually 
implements to the rejection and stigmatization. 
But, the reintegration itself has been written in 
Indonesian Law number 5 of 2018 about national 
counter-terrorism. The law requires reintegration 
as a part of the deradicalization program that aims 
to reintegrate radicalized people into society, 
including family.
Reintegration could not be separated from 
deradicalization because it is an integral and 
continuation process from deradicalization.Same 
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as deradicalization, reintegration emphasizes 
the process of reintegrating and supporting the 
former jihadist detainees into current activities 
in society, not as a program or resocialization. 
Instead, reintegration also could be understood 
as a process in which fighters (1) change their 
identity from ‘combatant’ to ‘civilian’ and 
(2) alter their behavior by ending the use of 
violent means and increasing activities that 
are sanctioned by the mainstream community 
(Torjesen 2013). Reintegration should not only 
define as returning but also restoring the rights 
and creating sustainable livelihood.
As a continuation phase from 
deradicalization and disengagement process, 
reintegration expects to restore the former 
jihadist detainees fundamental human rights, 
provide alternative solutions instead of joining 
radical groups and continue the deradicalization 
program outside the jail. Therefore, BNPT (Badan 
Nasional Penganggulangan Terorisme) or The 
Indonesian National Counter-radicalism Agency 
starts to compose pre- and post-reintegration’s 
plan in cooperation with local and national 
stakeholders especially Rehabilitation Center 
(Balai Pemasyarakatan or Bapas). The duties of 
Bapas are creating a social research to analyze 
the community readiness, providing counselling 
session during reintegration, and informing 
about government assistance nor deradicalization 
programs for former jihadist detainees. Ideally, 
on reintegration, the jihadist detainees’s progress 
needs to be regularly monitored, especially 
in their employment, family and community 
condition. In order to securing income stability, 
the state should provide economic access to 
support the former jihadist detainees in a form 
of small medium enterprise funding, scholarship 
and personal skill (Mardlatillah and Hidayat 
2019).
Jihadist detainees term refers to someone 
who believes that she or he fight for Jihad (in 
Arabic, jihad means struggle) and as a translation 
of mujahid in Arabic (Sedgwick 2015). The 
meaning of jihad and jihadist become narrow as 
it used by several actors to conduct radical actions 
in the name of religion. They understand jihad as 
an effort to enforce Islamic values by using many 
strategies including through violence. Thus, some 
radical organizations and figures also use this 
term to propagate others for political interest, for 
example establishing Islamic state. In this paper, 
former jihadist detainees would refer to those 
who have been involved in radical actions such as 
terrorism based on jihad and sentenced for terror 
activities. Hence, the researcher divides the Solo 
jihadist detainees into three groups: those in 
prison, those who have been released and those 
who still want to perpetrate acts of violence. In 
this research, the author chose those who have 
been released to see their reintegration to the 
society.
By using qualitative method through in-
depth interview, this paper presents stories of 
four former jihadist detainees in Solo region 
who could be the example of their struggles 
in reintegration process especially in social, 
economic, political and ideological objectives. The 
four former jihadist detainees would also frame 
the obstacles and opportunities that they have 
been encountered through their life experiences 
including their relations with state agencies and 
participation to a former jihadist organization. 
Furthermore, the interview also conducted with 
Rehabilitation center Klaten officer and Mr. 
Irwan from Sukoharjo Police department as 
the former jihadists’ counselors. The additional 
sources gained from social media narration that 
was published by the former jihadis, including the 
Yayasan Gema Salam and Badan Intelijen Negara 
(BIN) YouTube channel. It focuses on a research 
question, how the reintegration process could 
support the struggle of former jihadist detainees 
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in Solo region to re-establish their new lives. 
Reintegration for former jihadist detainees could 
be a tool to identify numerous problems and 
experiences in the post release phase. It could 
help to gain better understanding toward the 
problem arise to provide objectives for improving 
and developing further intervention (Weggemans 
and de Graaf 2017). The researchers argue that the 
former jihadists’ strategies, movements, progress 
and achievements in Solo region are interesting 
to be researched because their stories would 
emphasize that reintegration is a holistic, gradual 
and intense process after the detain period. It 
needs more concern and cooperation among 
state, organizations, society and the former 
jihadist detainees personally. Reintegration 
process also determines the re-emergence of 
their radical thinking related to their return 
and recommitment to the groups. Furthermore, 
the meaning of reintegration for former jihadist 
detainees needs to be broaden into not only re-
engage to the society but also contribute to the 
community development.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The study of reintegration should explain 
that reintegration as not only returning 
the former jihadist detainees to the host 
community, but also the basic human rights 
for former jihadist and their respective family 
(Ashour 2009; Horgan and Braddock 2011; 
Koehler 2018). Based on John Horgan study, 
reintegration process for former jihadist 
detainees is a prominent process that defines 
the encouragement of rejoining the group while 
the psychological and physical disengagement 
occurs as it mentioned on his works entitled 
Deradicalization vs Disengagement? A Process 
in Need of Clarity and a Counter-radicalism 
Initiative in Need of Evaluation (Horgan 2008). 
Mary Beth Altier, Emma Leonard Boyle, Neil 
D. Shortland & John G. Horgan emphasized 
the influence reintegration from community 
side on their work titled “Why They Leave: An 
Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events 
from Eighty-seven Autobiographical Accounts” 
that the impact of rejection and acceptance 
toward former jihadist detainees’ reintegration 
could influence their next steps and become 
a prominent issue in the disengagement and 
deradicalization process (Altier et al. 2017). 
The disengagement, deradicalization and 
reintegration of former jihadist detainees is 
more dynamic process to conduct because it 
involves the push and pull factor during their 
shifting paradigm period.
Meanwhile, in the study on extremist 
reintegration paths conducted by Julie Chernov 
Hwang, Samsu Rizal Panggabean, and Ihsan Ali 
Fauzi in their writing titled “Why Terrorist Quit?” 
and “The Disengagement of Jihadist detainees in 
Poso Indonesia (Chernov-Hwang 2018; Hwang, 
Panggabean, and Fauzi 2013),  they analyzed 
the variant reintegration processes of former 
extremists in Poso by using personal approach 
and elaborated on the difference between 
disengagement and deradicalization process 
similar to this research. Even though we uses 
their books as the primary literature, this research 
has distinguished social and cultural context that 
produces precise results. The communal conflict 
was motivating the Poso Jihadist detaineests; 
meanwhile, Solo was never experiencing a similar 
conflict. The existence of religious movements and 
socio-political tendencies such as disappointment 
toward government influence the growth of 
religious radicalism and terrorism in Solo region. 
It makes the reintegration approach for Poso and 
Solo region are different.
The study of reintegration in Indonesia 
also an interesting topic to be studied. 
Some scholars have been researched about 
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the reintegration process of former radical 
extremist group, member and distinctly, former 
jihadist detainees. Saifudin Asrori wrote about 
the disengagement, deradicalization and 
reintegration of former jihadist detainees by 
selecting Pesantren Al-Islam which owned by 
the Bali Bomber’s family, Chozin, and Yayasan 
Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP) which established 
by Ali Fauzi, the Bali boming actor(Asrori 
2019). On his writing, he explained how the 
presence of YLP and Pesantren could influence 
the disengagement of radical extremist 
members and force the deradicalization not 
only for the member but also family. He added 
that YLP also contributes toward the creation 
of project which involves the former jihadist 
detaineest of non-violent extremist group to 
the terrorist prisoners’ reintegration process. 
The writing persuades that the ex-terroristsin 
Lamongan has been succeed in the reintegration 
phase. While Asrori writing touches on the 
reintegration experience, Maliki described 
about the evaluation of social rehabilitation 
and reintegration of former jihadist detainees 
in Semarang. On his research, he stated that the 
social rehabilitation program inside the jail was 
ineffective because the radical networks still 
could be created, the insufficiency of prison’s 
officer in religious knowledge and unclear 
program structure to prepare their releasement. 
In reintegration process, the rejection from 
society still remains which makes difficult to 
prepare appropriate environment for their 
reintegration (Maliki 2013).
This research will enrich and fulfil the 
gaps from previous research in disengagement 
and deradicalization, which could influence 
reintegration because all three concepts are 
intertwined. Meanwhile, most of the literature 
about the reintegration process of former jihadist 
detainees by using the personal perspective and 
various contexts, especially in Solo and Indonesia, 
needs to be enhanced.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
One of the most influential literature in 
reintegration process titled “Towards A Theory 
of Ex-combatant Reintegration” written by Stina 
Toerjesen (Torjesen 2013). She provided a basic 
conceptualization to analyze the reintegration 
of former combatant through three main areas; 
economy, social, and political. These three points 
were based on socio-economy-political approach 
and expected to give useful tools in reintegration 
assessment. Whilst, in the end of her writing, she 
stated that reintegration would remain emerging 
further methodological independence of the 
researcher to expand the concept broadly.
Based on economic, social and political field from 
The Theory of Reintegration by Stina Torjesen 
(Torjesen 2013), the researchers develops 
broader schemes in for former jihadist detainees 
and applies the theory to this writing. It expects 
to be a tool for analyzing the achievement of 
reintegration’s dynamics and a linkage of different 
experiences and motivations to leave their 
previous life as a jihadi. The framework consists 
of an economic, social, political, and ideological 
scheme which also expects could be an evaluation 
and counter-challenge consideration not only for 
the former jihadist detainees but also the actor 
involves:
1. In the economic sphere, the former 
jihadist detainees could gain 
sustainable income through business 
or employment outside of the previous 
link/group and making regular reports 
after receiving financial aids.
2. The social sphere would emphasize 
the social circumstance and readiness 
of former jihadist detainees to return 
to society. In this phase, the most 
prominent issue is the condition 
of society started from the plan of 
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releasement until the reintegration. 
They have been disaffiliated with 
previous extremist groups, accepted 
by their surroundings, actively 
participate in community activities, 
and maintaining communication with 
state agencies. Thus, the other social 
activities could be joining organizations 
for former jihadist detainees and 
others similar which empower them 
economically and socially.
3. Because their involvement in jihad 
actions including terrorism is related 
to the government’s hostile attitude; 
former jihadist detainees need to be 
re-engaged by the state in political 
activities. Their participation in political 
events would help them to restore 
their trust toward the government, 
including participating in the election, 
establishing good relations with 
government agencies, and participate 
in national ceremonies such as the 
Independence Day ceremony
4. The ideological sphere becomes 
the most challenging issue, not 
only in reintegration but also in the 
deradicalization process. The difference 
between political and ideological 
framework is politic refers to the former 
jihadist detainees’ tangible attitude in 
responding the governmental issues 
including the relations with state 
agencies, participation in election and 
recognizing state policy. Meanwhile, 
ideological framework emphasizes 
to the thinking transformation and 
construction related to radicalism.   The 
difficulty occurs because it is intangible 
and place as the core of radicalism. This 
ideological transformation is covering; 
radical thinking transformation 
including the framing of ‘enemy,’ the 
meaning of Jihad, and violence, the 
changes toward religious understanding 
from exclusive to inclusive, especially 
in interpreting religious narratives, 
willingness to realize the previous 
actions while conducting the terror, a 
shifting perspective toward religious 
leaders and figure and re-engage and 
re-admit Pancasila as the fundamental 
basis of the state. Moreover, it also 
includes in personal scope that makes 
it uneasy about being intervened and 
measured. Thereupon it causes limited 
external influence from the state, non-
state, and society.
RESEARCH METHOD
In this paper, the researcher used the 
qualitative method through in-depth interview 
with four former jihadist detaineess in Solo 
region. Then, it was strengthened by secondary 
informants who have been involved in the 
reintegration process of the former jihadist 
detainees. Meanwhile, other supporting 
references come from several social media 
contents produced by the state agencies and the 
former jihadist detainees’ organization that have 
been contributed toward the process. 
The researcher came directly to the 
former jihadist detainees in Solo Region. Some 
of them agreed to be visited in their houses but 
some did not. The researcher chose four former 
jihadist detainees based on their availability 
and agreement to be interviewed because not 
all former jihadist detainees were allowing the 
researchers to have an interview. In addition, the 
four former jihadist detainees also have variety of 
backgrounds, cases and actions on their journey 
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of being a jihadist detainee such as bombing and 
poisoning plan.  The four informants’ age are 
between 35 to 50 years old. All of the informant 
identities and affiliations such as name and 
employment were using shadow names because 
of confidential issue. They would use Malik, 
Rahman, Mubarak and Yahya name as their 
pseudonym. It was slightly difficult to find the 
former jihadist detainees who are willing to be 
interviewed because most of them are ignore to 
be exposed as a former jihadist detainee. In some 
cases, the police officers helped in profiling and 
selecting the informants since some of the former 
jihadist detainees are still under monitoring of 
BNPT and consider as person with high radical 
level. Additional information that is useful for 
validating their information gained from Bapas 
Klaten and Sukoharjo’s Police officers namely 
Mr.Irwan who are working on the reintegration 
process of former jihadist detainees in Solo 
region. The other supporting references came 
from social media narration that was published 
by the former jihadist detainees, including the 
Yayasan Gema Salam and Badan Intelijen Negara 
(BIN) YouTube channel, which contains the 
personal journey of former jihadist detainees in 
Solo’s transformation.
The Profile of Figures
In this research, there are four former 
jihadist detainees in Solo region who were willing 
to explain their stories briefly in the nuance of 
their social, political, economic and ideological 
aspects. 
The first former jihadi is Malik. Malik 
was involved in what he called as jihad through 
conducting a poisoning plan at Polda Metro Jaya 
in 2011. During his job in Jakarta, he met several 
people in Abubakar Baasyir’s public recitation at 
the mosque near his boarding house. In the public 
recitation, he has an encounter with several people 
with the same understanding and drive to learn 
Islamic teachings. They communicated intensively 
eventually creating pengajian tertutup (exclusive 
recitation) with seven members including him. 
With these six other people, his radical thinking 
started to grow. It was strengthened by 2010 
when he visited Ustadz Fajar Taslim and Abu 
Husna, in the jail. Fajar Taslim is the main actor 
behind the Palembang terror actions in 2007 and 
Abu Husna is a terrorist prisoner who convicted 
for hiding Abu Dujana, the suspect of Poso attack 
in 2007. During his visit, he received tausyiah 
(a short Islamic preaching from religious figure 
which contains messages in terms of truth and 
religious value) from Fajar Taslim and Abu 
Husna. Not only receiving tausyiah, he was also 
experiencing discrimination from the police 
officers. Malik was not allowed to bring food to 
Fajar Taslim but after he left, only half of the food 
remained. Another occurrence which shaped his 
actions came after he visited Ustadz Abu Husna, 
where he was locked in the cell by the prison 
officer. After these discriminations and learning 
process of Jihad with the group, his willingness to 
take the revenge arise. Then, with other fellows, 
he created a plan to poisoning people who attend 
Independence Day ceremony in Polda Metro Jaya 
as an effort for jihad and defending Muslim from 
discrimination. But before he commenced the 
action, he was arrested by Special Detachment 
88 (Densus 88). After he was caught, Malik was 
trialed for six years imprisonment, but in the final 
trial was finally sentenced to four years. Granted 
parole, he only spent three years and three months 
total time in prison. Then, Malik was released and 
reintegrated in 2014.
The second jihadi is Rahman who was 
convicted for gun smuggling and attack plan to 
police office. Rahman was a middle-aged man 
who work works as a company officer in Jakarta 
until he met some people from a public recitation 
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in a mosque near his house. Along with them, 
he joined with a Muslim solidarity group, which 
responding the Poso and Ambon conflicts as a 
part of concern toward Muslim condition in the 
conflict field. He and his friends were going to 
Poso to fight as a jihadist while the rest collected 
money in Jakarta through charity boxes. After 
all of the former fighters returned, their feelings 
and memories about the war stayed remaining. 
Because they have witnessed violence toward 
Muslim, they committed to defend Islam by 
conducting military training based on Al-Qur’an 
Al-Anfal verse 60 (prepare against them what 
force you can and horses tethered (fed for war). 
Thereby you may dismay the enemy of Allah and 
your enemy, and others besides them who are 
unknown to you but known to Allah. Whatever 
you spend in the Way of Allah, it will be paid back 
to you thoroughly, and you shall not be wronged) 
and the team sprang to several Jakarta regions. 
Rahman became the leader of West Jakarta team. 
Therefore, they collected the money and bought 
the gun from Philippines privately. The gun 
couriers transferred the gun from the Philippines 
to Kalimantan via ferry, then continued to 
couriers in Makassar and ended in Tanjung 
Perak, Surabaya. When they arrived in Tanjung 
Perak, they were arrested. After that interception, 
the government started the further operation to 
find the gun smuggler’s network until finally 
found Rahman’s involvement. He stated that 
mapping activities that they have done existed, 
but it was not proposed to conduct a terror. It 
was aimed for preparation for preventing same 
conflicts as Ambon and Poso and as a jihadist, he 
tried to implement Al-Anfal verse 60. Rahman 
was arrested in 2011 and sued for eight years in 
prison. Then, he received parole in the middle of 
his prison term and reintegrated in 2015.
The next former Jihadi namely Mubarak 
began his journey as a jihadist from his curiosity to 
learn Islam. Mubarak was a success businessman 
in Klaten until he went for Hajj and realized that he 
has a lack of religious knowledge. Then, he learned 
about Islamic teaching from ustad (Syeikh) in a 
mosque near his house. Time by time, he realized 
that in his surrounding, people divided based 
on two biggest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Mubarak’s 
eagerness to find the reason and ‘truth’ led him 
to join both organizations. But he could not find 
the ‘truth’. When his curiosity was getting bigger, 
Mubarak continues his spiritual journey to Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS (Islam-based party in 
Indonesian parliamentary). When he joined PKS, 
he usually received leaflets containing narration 
about condemnation toward democracy, such 
as “democracy is heretical” and “democracy 
is haram.” Mubarak was questioning and 
investigating it until he found that it was from 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or HTI, a radical Islamist 
group in Indonesia. Then, he moved to HTI and 
acknowledged that the leaflet’s contents are 
justified by religious narrations. In HTI, Mubarak 
could meet and interact with many Islam activists, 
including those who come from MMI or Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahedeen 
Council). In MMI, Mubarak could have a direct 
encounter with Abubakar Baasyir and became 
his fans. The time when Abubakar Baasyir was 
supporting ISIS and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid 
(JAT), a terrorist organization which affiliates 
with ISIS, Mubarak followed Baasyir’s decision. 
Mubarak joined Azzam Dakwah Center (ADC), 
a camouflage organization of ISIS supporters 
which works for dakwah and social projects. 
ADC had a building in Solo city as a typical non-
profit organization, but it aimed to drive the 
establishment of the Islamic state. After receiving 
command from ISIS, Mubarak willingness to be 
a Jihadist was growing stronger. He and other 
eight comrades committed bombing attack in 
one of Solo’s restaurant owns by a Chinese who 
was reported as blasphemer because of ripping 
Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion Volume 06 Number 02 December 2021
Pages 217-234
224
Al-Qur’an. In his prison term, he informed by the 
Police that it was wrong information. Mubarak 
was arrested in 2016 and sentenced to 3,5 years of 
punishment, but he received parole and national 
leave (cuti bersama nasional). Therefore, he only 
needed to spend two years and seven months and 
released in 2019.
The last jihadi is Yahya. Yahya spent 
most of his education time in public school and 
continued to an Islamic school in Solo, the Al-
Mukmin Ngruki Foundation, owned by Abu Bakar 
Baasyir. He learned about Islamic teachings in 
that school, attended Abu Bakar Baasyir and 
Abdullah Manaf recitations, and visited many 
other Islamic recitations. There, he met several 
Islamic religious teachers and learned from them. 
When the conflict in Ambon occurred in 1999, his 
understanding of Jihad fissabilillah (fight in the 
name of God) started to rise and he motivated 
to be a jihadist. Yahya also joined Negara Islam 
Indonesia (NII) but after several involvements, he 
quieted because of its high radical doctrines. Then, 
because Yahya’s hobby is reading, he read many 
Laskar Jihad (Jihad Army) magazines and a book 
titled Tarbiyah Jihadiyah. Tarbiyah Jihadiyah 
is a book that contains a compilation of Abdullah 
Azam preaching for Mujahidin (Islamic fighter) 
in Afghanistan which also contributes to the 
emergence of Jihad Afghanistan or now well-
known as Al-Qaeda and his motivations to 
fight for religion. After Yahya graduated from 
Senior High School, he numerous sweeping 
activities based on the Islamic teaching called 
Amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (fighting against 
badness and enforcing goodness) emerged in 
Solo Region. A group, namely Hisbah Team 
or Tim Hisbah (Hisbah means justice), led by 
Sigit Qordhowi, a terrorist shot dead by Special 
Detachment 88 in 2011, started the movement. 
Yahya joined with the organization because he 
felt that his involvement could strengthen his 
motivation to be a jihadist. In the meantime, Tim 
Hisbah believed that the government has failed 
in solving many social problems in Solo, such 
as prostitution, gambling, and alcohol selling. 
At the first time, the primary mission of the 
Tim Hisbah was fighting against mischief, but it 
changed when Sigit Qordhowi re-arranged the 
tasks into more radical in practice. Around 2010, 
Tim Hisbah members were gathered and pledged 
for a death vow (bai’at mati), which means they 
should be loyal to Sigit Qordhowi and have been 
commanded to learn about assembling a bomb, 
creating detonator, exploding the bomb, and 
using guns for Jihad. Sigit Qordhowi’s comrades 
committed several minor bombing incidents 
without any coordination and put the group in 
chaos. The police started a special investigation 
until some of them have arrested. Regarding the 
chaotic situation, Sigit Qordhowi commanded 
Yahya and his friend to escape to Cirebon. In 
Cirebon, they met a group organized by Musolah 
and friends. Musolah group is a terrorist group 
behind the Cirebon Police Office, which was 
causing 25 people injured, and planned to merge 
his group with Yahya’s. But after the Cirebon 
bombing occurred, Yahya considered as involve 
in the accident and was arrested in 2011. He was 
sentenced to seven years imprisonment but only 
served for about six years because of the parole.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The Reintegration Process of Former 
Jihadist Detainees in Solo Region: 
Challenges and Opportunities
The reintegration process among former 
jihadist detainees in Solo region would show how 
the external and internal factors could influence 
their transformation. By focusing on the four 
objectives of reintegration; social, political, 
economic, and ideological, personal and other 
actors’ contribution toward their changes will 
discover. It will also answer the dilemma on the 
needs of implementing reintegration in practice.
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Social Reintegration
The Malik and Yahya reintegration were 
gaining acceptance from the host community. 
Malik’s neighbors helped him to build a house 
and allowed him to work. He and his family 
developed good relations with society and actively 
participate in public events such as community 
gatherings, kerja bakti, and assisting neighbors if 
they face administrative problems with the police 
department using his close connection with 
state agencies. Malik also contributes toward his 
community development by establishing a fish 
farming for empowering youth around him. After 
receiving funding and training from Diponegoro 
University, he started the fish farming with the 
youth. Malik could distribute his fish to several 
distributor in Central Java, improve the economy 
for his family and surrounding and strengthening 
his relationship with society. Meanwhile, Yahya 
was able to maintain his relationship with the 
community because he had been well-known 
as a knowledgeable person prior to his arrest. 
In fact, he had been appointed as a religious 
preacher in his district, a position he continues 
to hold1. According to Malik’s neighbor, his kind 
and helpful behavior toward surrounding, both 
before and after being a detainee, helped him to 
regain the trust from society. Meanwhile, Balai 
Pemasyarakatan or Bapas (Rehabilitation Center) 
Klaten officer as one of Yahya’s counsellors stated 
that Yahya’s intelligent and charismatic figure 
play a key role in society acceptance. 
Unlike Malik and Yahya, both Mubarak and 
Rahman experienced social stigmatization and 
could not escape the label of “terrorist.” Mubarak 
was shunned by his neighbor, which affected his 
business, and rejection from his son-in-law’s 
family. He spent three months trying to approach 
them and to adjust to their reactions. Also, he 
1 This stories according to Bapas Klaten officers and Malik’s 
wife
tried to explain the problem of his involvement 
in a radical group to his family. All of his efforts 
aimed to restore people’s trust towards him so 
he could continue his new life. Not only from 
society, but his son also put distrust on him by 
asking to move from Islamic boarding school 
in Ngruki to public school in Klaten because he 
afraid of being jihadist detainee like his father in 
the future. Finally, he fulfilled the permission. 
Now, Mubarak success in regaining the public 
and family trust. 
Like Mubarak, after Rahman returned 
to his hometown of Karanganyar, he suffered 
from stigmatization. This affected not only him, 
individually, but also his family. Rahman’s 
children and wife have struggled to socialize with 
those in their community because most people 
in his village kept their distance from them. The 
worst social problem they faced was the rapid 
spread of information about Rahman’s actions 
as a former jihadist. It made all of the people 
in his sub-district aware of him and his family. 
The family spent three years from 2015 to 2018 
striving to gain public trust. Even though he 
has welcomed by society, the terrorist label was 
attached to him. During our interview sessions, 
this researcher met some people and mentioned 
Rahman’s name, but they were confused. When 
the researcher explained about Rahman and his 
employment, people claimed not to be aware of 
this. After the researcher confirmed the issue to 
Rahman, he said that there were two reasons 
for peoples’ confusion. First, there are three 
individuals named Rahman in the district. Second, 
the villagers would not recognize his name if 
a visitor only mentioned Rahmans’ name and 
employment, because he is commonly recognized 
as ‘Rahman the terrorist’ rather than ‘Rahman 
the village businessman’ or ‘Rahman jamu’. 
People tend to call him by the name “Rahman 
the terrorist,” although this clearly makes him 
uncomfortable. In the end, however, he can do 
Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion Volume 06 Number 02 December 2021
Pages 217-234
226
nothing about this and accepts it for what it is. 
Therefore, in an effort to erase the label, he engages 
with the local society by empowering youth in 
fish farming, involving himself in jamu making, 
and working in village businesses. He wants to 
be known as a Rahman jamu or ‘Rahman village 
business’ rather than as ‘Rahman the terrorist.’ 
Rahman believes that the labelling issue is the 
state agency’s responsibility because everyone in 
his village knew his case based on publications.
Luckily, Mubarak, Malik, Yahya and 
Rahman family members. According to Malik’s 
wife and Bapas Klaten officers’s statements, 
the family and relatives have accepted the four 
former jihadist detainee’ return, because even 
during the time in which they were involved in 
terror actions, they still fulfilled their role as a 
father and husband as usual and maintain a good 
relationship with their families. It was partly 
because of this that their wives and children were 
not aware of their commitment to conducting the 
terror. But in some stories, there are indications 
that family support could potentially contribute 
to the disengagement process (Harris-Hogan 
2014).
Malik, Yahya, Rahman, and Mubarak 
have all been disaffiliated from the radical 
groups to which they once belonged. They said 
that most of their fellow group members have 
arrested and the groups demolished. They have 
no connections with their comrades as a group, 
but Yahya and Mubarak sometimes have virtual 
communication with their friends as individuals. 
Mubarak said that some of his fellows might 
feel uncomfortable about this because, as they 
know, after his reintegration, Mubarak worked 
with military agencies, especially Densus 88. 
Because of these circumstances, several people in 
his previous network (ISIS and JAD) called him 
murtad (apostate) and kafir (infidel)
Economic Reintegration
Economically, most of the former jihadist 
detainees were experiencing difficulties right 
after their reintegration. Malik worked as a 
laborer while Mubarak was a temporary worker 
in several places until he received financial 
assistance. Furthermore, Mubarak was involved 
with debts for maintaining his family’s economy. 
The same condition also occurs in Rahman and 
Yahya’s life. They could establish the business 
after receiving aids from some government 
institutions such as the Ministry of Social Affairs 
(Kementerian Sosial) and BNPT. The assistance 
helps them start the small business and restoring 
the family’s economic condition. They considered 
that prioritizing economic issues gives them an 
alternative way to disengage from their radical 
group, especially for Mubarak. Mubarak’s 
contemplation of his previous actions also brings 
him into an economic acknowledgment that 
by joining radical groups, he overrides family 
matters and only focuses on Jihad. Moreover, he 
also mentioned that most of his friends who are 
still involved in several radical groups had faced 
economic problems. 
Although it has been mentioned in an article 
of Convey Indonesia, a project between UIN 
Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and UNDP (United 
Nations Development Program), that “Economic 
instability, poverty, and unemployment 
acknowledged to be the driven factor of a person 
to get involved in terrorism, radicalism, and 
violent extremism”(2019) but the economic 
issue on reintegration suggests the opposite. The 
story of Malik, Rahman, Yahya and Mubarak’s 
participation in radical actions shows that there is 
no significant connection between one’s economic 
condition and their motivation for becoming 
involved in jihad. Therefore, economic plans 
should not be the only prominent mechanism 
for detaching former jihadist detainees from 
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their religious radical group nor jihad activities. 
Mubarak explained about financial difficulties 
among his jihad fellows. He said that most of 
the former terrorist prisoners joined extremist 
groups in the name of jihad because of political 
and ideological problems. Then, they disengaged 
from their groups because of family concerns. In 
the meantime, some people who called themselves 
as a jihadist had come to believe that they were 
not the only ones who faced economic problems, 
but that other people in society also struggled 
with these because of social discrimination and 
inequality. It motivated them to express their 
spirit to enforce justice through jihad actions. 
Political Reintegration
The personal experiences related to 
discrimination, knowledge that gained through 
public recitation or literature, involvement in 
religious radical and extremism group which 
propagating the government let them to 
commit radical nor violence actions which they 
considered Jihad to achieve the changes they 
desired. Therefore, the most tangible way to 
examine their political reintegration is to consider 
their attitudes toward political activities. 
While the former jihadist detainees were 
being more radical and sought to enforce what they 
regarded as Islamic values rather than accepting 
the state constitution, that is a manifestation 
of understanding about jihad. The rise of social 
problems has frequently triggered radical 
extremist people to tackle the issue by starting 
anti-government movements, which sometimes 
include the use of violence. Such extremists use 
religious doctrine as their fundamental logic and 
as a weapon, for example conducting massive 
raids into known sites of prostitution and 
gambling in the name of enforcing Islamic values. 
As Yahya said, society accepts the raids and takes 
advantages from the activities in their daily lives 
such as the decrease number of criminal cases. 
Such circumstances that create by the Islamic 
group’s raid have also contributed to the rapid 
growth of Islamic movement in the Solo Region. 
Recently, after Yahya reintegrated, he noticed that 
the Solo region government had started to solve 
various social problems, which resulted in his 
growing trust of the government. Furthermore, 
Mubarak’s intense collaboration with Detasemen 
88 or Densus 88 (Special Detachment 88) in 
The Wedangan, a restaurant that established 
by Densus 88 for empowering former jihadist 
detainees in Solo, the relationship between Malik 
and Sragen’s military agency are further evidence 
of a trust rebuilding between the government and 
former jihadist detainee.
Ideological Reintegration
The former jihadist detainees ideological 
thinking could not be separated from political 
transformation. Here the presence of ideological 
transformation places as the core changes of 
radicalism and could be detected from their 
framing of an enemy, the meaning of Jihad, 
and violence, the changes toward religious 
understanding from exclusive to inclusive, 
especially in interpreting religious narratives, 
willingness to realize the previous actions while 
conducting the terror, a shifting perspective 
toward religious leaders, and re-engage and re-
admit Pancasila as the fundamental basis of the 
state constitution. Direct encounter with ‘enemy’, 
literatures, government attitude’s change and 
religious leaders influence play the major role 
in the ideological transformation among four 
former jihadist detainees in Solo. The changes 
occur started from their imprisonment phase 
until reintegration.
One of the strategies to identify the religious 
radical thinking shift among former jihadist 
detainees in the Solo Region is examining their 
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construction toward enemy and Jihad. The two 
issues prominently influence their motivations 
and actual conditions during the reintegration. 
All four informants show different ideological 
transformations which have manifested in their 
perspectives, narratives, and attitudes. Previously, 
Malik, Rahman, Mubarak, and Yahya were 
framing that enemy is government, people from 
another religion nor Muslim which considers as 
do not belong to their group. They also believed 
that strategy to commit Jihad is through violence. 
But, after they received a conviction, surpassing 
personal journey, and deradicalization program 
during imprisonment, it changes. Malik, who has 
been preparing poison for police officers in Polda 
Metro Jaya, is currently becoming a police and 
military partner through his personal relations 
with them such as intense communication via 
social media and regular visitation. His direct 
encounter with a police officer who helped him to 
smuggle some books in prison, military agencies 
worked in building Malik’s house along with 
society, and a ‘brotherhood relationship’ with 
army officers during his reintegration phase have 
erased the bad image of them. Almost similar 
to Malik, Mubarak also experienced receiving 
assistance from government and military 
agencies who previously believed as an incapable 
institution. After he returns, he has been 
supported by Densus 88 in obtaining a job and 
capital for establishing a food stall. Both of them 
have been re-establish their conceptualization 
toward the enemy and break radical ideology. 
Meanwhile, the unique circumstance occurs on 
Yahya and Rahman.
Yahya’s radical ideology grew because of 
some kinds of literature, the religious leaders’ 
influence, and the government’s response in 
solving the social problems. His affiliation with 
the group was because he received indoctrination 
and willingness to make a change in society in the 
name of jihad. Additionally, the main enemy in 
Yahya’s view were the gamblers, prostitutes, and 
troublemakers until it shifted into police officers 
and government who have been suppressed his 
team during sweeping which he considered as 
the obstacle for jihad. His eagerness to detach 
the radical thinking is because of the counter 
narrations that he received from books in the 
jail’s library, new religious teachers whom he met 
in prison, and counseling session from BNPT. 
Another prominent issue in the Yahya case is the 
constructive thinking that the main enemy is the 
social problem, not the government. Therefore, 
supported by the improvement of the state’s 
action to overcome those issues effectively, his 
radical idea collapses steadily. It means that both 
Yahya and government are in the same boat. 
Concurrently, Rahman insists that the reason 
behind his affiliation with the military training 
and gun smuggling is a religious command 
called Ihdad (preparation) to prevent the 
repeated conflict alike in Poso. On one side, it was 
causing a blurry on his enemy framing because 
he never mentioned specific identifications whom 
he opposes. But on the other side, he reflects a 
displeasure toward the government related to 
family matters, for example, when he talked 
about responsibility to restore his reputation and 
aim to defend Muslim that committed for jihad 
but being labelled as an extremist or radical by 
the state.
Before gaining understanding about the 
former jihadist detainees dramatic transformation 
of radical ideology from offensive and defensive 
to exclusively defensive (Chernov-Hwang 2018), 
the main problem is their framing of enemy. The 
jihadist detainees indicate themselves as a victim 
not an attacker, the one who called as ‘innocent’ 
has collective responsible, and their actions is a 
way to express the revolution willingness such 
as toward government legitimacy issues (Cohan 
2006; Held 2004). In the case of former jihadist 
detainees in Solo region, the time when they obtain 
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personal experiences that change their thinking 
(usually during disengagement), they possibly 
deconstruct their previous ideologies (Bjørgo 
and Horgan 2009). Amongst Malik, Mubarak, 
Rahman, and Yahya, the representation of the 
enemy has changed and influenced their social, 
political, and economic relations during their 
reintegration. Although Rahman’s point of view 
toward the reason behind his previous operation 
considers as faint to be detected as radicalism 
residue, his less violent behavior could be seen as a 
positive ideological transformation. Interestingly, 
all of their understandings toward Jihad also 
shifted. Jihad that defined as a strive in the 
name of God against kafir (infidel) by justifying 
violent actions, transformed into a more inclusive 
meaning. Rather than war, their religious 
interpretations toward the word ‘Jihad’ expand 
to struggle in achieving goals by any means, 
including wealth, spirit, and knowledge based on 
the religious values and prophet Muhammad’s 
attitude (Irawan 2014). 
Religious value believes in containing 
compassion, peace, and humanity that need to 
be practiced in families, society, and the country. 
For Malik, Rahman, and Mubarak, manifesting 
Islamic values by using arms considered 
improper according to the current condition of 
Indonesia. Meanwhile, Yahya determines that 
coercion in the name of Islam would only emerge 
Islamophobia and give disadvantageous toward 
Muslim. Furthermore, Yahya, Malik, Rahman, 
and Mubarak have started to collaborate with the 
government in making some small enterprises 
involved in social activities, for example, when 
Rahman empowers society in Jamu making or 
Yahya’s work in religious preaching, and joining 
deradicalization program with BNPT. Also, they 
have decided to re-accept Pancasila as the state’s 
fundamental basis after previously demanded to 
establish an Islamic state and do not easily label 
others as kafir (infidel).
The Role of State and Non-state Agencies 
during Reintegration
Analyzing the journey of four former jihadist 
detainees in Solo region during their social, 
economic, political and ideological reintegration 
raises the notion on how the state and non-state 
stakeholders contribute to the process. It also 
determines the accomplishment of reintegration 
to prevent the emergence of recidivist.
In this section, the author would explain the 
role of state and non-state actors’ involvement 
on the preparation, progress and achievements 
of reintegration in Solo Region. It also adds the 
obstacles and the needs of improvement toward 
the process.
Before the former jihadist detainees 
reintegrated, state institutions through Bapas, 
the prison (Lembaga Pemasyarakatan), Police, 
and the military agency would conduct Litmas 
or Penelitian Pemasyarakatan (Social Research) 
related to evaluating the readiness of society for 
their return. There are two Bapas who involved 
in the reintegration process of former jihadist 
detainees in Solo region. First Bapas Solo 
which covers Solo city, Boyolali, Karanganyar 
and Sragen. Second, Bapas Klaten for Klaten, 
Sukoharjo and Wonogiri. Both Bapas work in 
integration and cooperation in related field.  The 
preparation for the former jihadist detainees’ 
parole and reintegration requires a signature 
from the heads of their village and district 
as representatives of society. It also requires 
agreements from their family and neighbors. After 
the bureaucratic process related to the district, 
family and neighborhood was accomplished, the 
Social Counselor (Pembimbing Kemasyarakatan) 
of Bapas Solo and/or Klaten would send the 
result to the prison where it would be examined 
before the letter was issued. After the jihadist 
detainees are released, the Bapas’s concern 
toward their reintegration process would focus 
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on the former terrorist in particular, largely 
restricted to aftercare related to their social 
condition. Sometimes the Social Counselor, 
Police, and military agencies would visit them to 
monitor their activities, but there was no routine 
social monitoring. Take the case of Rahman 
as an example of how society could influence 
the reintegration process. In the beginning of 
social research, the host community agreed to 
accept him and his family. They also signed the 
letter of acceptance and provide equal treatment 
for Rahman and his family. But in fact, some 
people still labelling Rahman as a former jihadist 
detainee or further, terrorist. The social dynamic 
that my occurs in society including the behavioral 
changes among society need to be concerned by 
the respective institution. It raises a question on 
how the continuous monitoring should be created 
in reintegration(Weggemans and de Graaf 2017).
After the former jihadist detainees 
reintegrated to the host community, 
economic sustainability becomes one of the 
most challenging issues to overcome. In the 
counter-radicalism agenda, the Indonesian 
government focuses on disengagement rather 
than deradicalization because disengagement 
shows tangible transformations based on former 
terrorist jihaidsts’ behavioral changes (Asrori 
2019). These changes come from the alternatives 
that they receive after they disengage from radical 
groups. One of the choices is restoring their 
economic circumstances after their release. 
Even though the economic approach is 
necessary for breaking the cycle of radicalism, 
it needs further monitoring and evaluation 
in terms of how financial assistance is 
distributed. According to Mr. Irwan, the 
head of police intelligent department and 
counsellor of former jihadist detainee  in the 
Solo region, the Bapas Solo and Klaten and 
Solo military agencies assist in aid distribution 
to purchase the equipment, and build a small 
enterprise. BNPT also provides Pop Warung 
program, a small store which sells daily needs 
for the former jihadist detainees in several 
region. For Solo region, there are six former 
jihadist detainees who received the assistance 
including Rahman and Malik. Meanwhile, 
Mubarak received funding from BNPT which 
amount 10 million to establish the soto stall 
and Yahya received 15 million from Ministry of 
social affairs to build his food stalls. Moreover, 
Yahya received goats from Klaten and 
Surakarta’s police agencies and Malik received 
goat from the Ministry of social affairs that 
he developed to be a farm along with cow and 
duck. The process of economic assimilation 
is regarded as important to escalating the 
religious radical thinking transformation 
and providing the alternative for their 
future (Nillson, Sweden, and Styrelsen för 
internationellt utvecklingssamarbete 2005).
Instead of the deradicalizing issue, 
evaluation of economic assistance is also 
related to the independence of former jihadist 
detaineess. The former jihadist detainee  receive 
‘extraordinary attention’ from the government, 
which includes intense training from BNPT and 
numerous sources of financial aid from the Ministry 
of Social Affairs or other institutions. These 
circumstances potentially influence the former 
jihadist detainees’ economic independence, such 
as establishing an enterprise if they only receive 
capital from the government. By being subject to 
regular monitoring and evaluation, they would 
feel responsibilities toward their belongings and 
work on it seriously. Furthermore, it also could 
prevent the problem of capital being misused, 
such as to support or establish new terrorist 
networks (Bambang Sugeng Rukmono 2020). 
In addition, extra concern for former jihadist 
detainees’s economy might cause resentment 
among other jihadist detainees.
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Until 2021, about 160 former terrorist 
prisoners, also jihadist detaineess, had been 
released in the Solo region but there was 
only a single coordinator from BNPT for 
the Central Java region2.This causes lack of 
comprehensive monitoring the former jihadist 
detainees’s progress after receiving the aids 
such as gradual report and visitation to each 
former jihadist detainees businesses. One of 
the strategies to overcome this problem is the 
centralization of the distribution, monitoring, 
and data collection relating to local former 
terrorist prisoner’s organizations. For the Solo 
Region, the government collaborates with 
Yayasan Gema Salam. After jihadist detainees 
are released from prison, BNPT allows them to 
join the former terrorist prisoners’ organization 
to gain information about regular national 
deradicalization programs, financial assistance, 
and other activities. The distribution scheme 
is based on organizational data including 
name, affiliation, address, etc. After that, Gema 
Salam would inform their members and invite 
them to join the assistance meetings with the 
government. Here, it plays a key role in bridging 
the government and former jihadist detainee’ 
communication. If a former jihadist detainees 
rejects the offer to join with Gema Salam, he would 
not be eligible to obtain aid. Their involvement in 
the organization could also be used to determine 
the status of former jihadist detainee . It is worth 
noting, that former jihadist detainees who reject 
assistance from the Indonesian government are 
potentially still attached to their earlier radical 
leanings. The complicated situation regarding 
their choices makes government institutions 
and many other actors including NGOs attempt 
to approach them personally, while at the same 
time, the National Intelligence agency monitors 
2  This statement is based on an interview session with 
Mr. Irwan as the Head of the Intelligent department 
at Sukoharjo Police Office. He is also working as the 
counselor for former terrorist prisoners in Solo Region
them strictly. 
One path that possibly implements to 
maintain and restore the ideological and 
political transformation of former jihadist 
detainees is involving them directly in the 
national deradicalization program collaborates 
with the government institution. Both of 
them need a space and interdependency 
relationship. The Indonesian government 
could collaborate with former jihadist 
detainees in Solo Region to map, monitor the 
existing radicalism movements nor actors 
around Solo. Also, they could support the 
effort to maintain a humanistic approach 
toward other reintegrated ex-jihadist 
detainees who are considered by Densus 88 
and BNPT as highly radicals. Then, the former 
terrorist prisoners could obtain assistance 
and protection from government agencies, as 
experienced by Ali Imron, one of Bali bombing 
actor who is working for helping government in 
counterterrorism agenda. Recently, every year 
they are invited to attend the deradicalization 
program by BNPT as participants. Also, their 
participation in the election or attendance in 
the Independence Day ceremony could not be 
the only benchmark to measure their hatred 
evolvement to the nation. They are supposed to 
be more active in working with state agencies 
on counter radicalism programs practically. 
This plan figures to be a strategy to restore the 
former jihadist detainees trust and retaining 
the deradicalization process throughout 
reintegration. 
One strategy that has been accomplished 
by both government and former jihadist 
detainees is the creation of media narration 
in counter-radicalism issues in the online 
platform. Yayasan Gema Salam’s videos about 
the visitation from BNPT and local governments 
to their organizations nor small enterprises, 
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the development of former terrorist prisoner’s 
business, and social activities in communities 
could be a tool to show their transformations and 
contributions for public goods. Concurrently, 
Badan Intelijen Negara or BIN (Indonesian 
Intelligent Agency) Republic Indonesia also 
creates YouTube content about the profile of 
some jihadist detainees in Solo as a campaign 
and public education in counter-radicalism 
programs. The creation of alternative narratives 
in media potentially emerge the public awareness 
toward the issues, directly involving the former 
jihadist detainees in the deradicalization 
process and countering propaganda distribution 
in media (Glazzard 2017; Reed, Haroro J 
Ingram, and Whittaker 2017). The case of Yahya 
shows how the counter-narratives played a 
prominent role in changing his mindset. In 
this rapid technological development, social 
media platforms usages as a counter-narrative 
communication utterly important to pursue.
CONCLUSION
From this research, the researcher 
concludes several issues related to the study 
of reintegration for former jihadist detainees. 
In a discussion about jihadist detainees, the 
understanding toward the term should be divided 
to three categories: those in prison, those who 
have been released and those who still want to 
perpetrate acts of violence. In this research, the 
author chose those who have been released to see 
their reintegration to the society. It would help to 
prevent the overlapping of analysis. 
The transformation of thinking and 
perspective toward jihad has occurred among the 
four former jihadist in Solo region. Their jihad as 
radical group’s member has ended but jihad as a 
Muslim keep remains in a new life. Even though 
they might face exclusion or stigmatization from 
their previous group for example being called as 
apostate and infidel. The understanding captured 
from their decision to disaffiliate from their 
network and thinking shift toward Jihad. Rather 
than return to previous group, they join to the 
former jihadist detainees’ organization namely 
Yayasan Gema Salam. 
Deeper transformation could be analysed 
from their political, economic, social and 
ideological aspects. Yahya efforts to establish 
his own food stalls by using the assistances from 
government institution, Malik and Rahman’s 
contribution toward community development 
through fish farming and Jamu making, and 
Mubarak cooperation with Densus 88 in The 
Wedangan reflects the accomplishment of 
reintegration broadly. Their previous narrow 
conception of jihad refers to the usage of 
violence in the name of religion but it expands 
into an effort which reflects the compassion 
of religion such as earn a living for family and 
empowering the surrounding. 
Looking at the result of reintegration process, 
government from local to national need to create 
gradual and more comprehensive reintegration 
scheme started from the preparation to aftercare. 
The problem of human resources for monitoring 
the former jihadist detainees in Central Java, for 
example, shows the demand of improvement. 
Yet, the Bapas research, counselling session, 
psychological support, financial distribution and 
government strategy for involving the former 
jihadist detainees in counter radicalism program 
considered as achievements.
Lastly, the relationship between religion 
radicalism, extremism terrorism cannot be 
prevented. While religion is not the leading 
cause of terrorism, radicalism, and extremism, 
many violent actions have a religious 
dimension. The jihadist detainees, both as 
a person or organization, is often citing the 
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holy book verses, misinterpreting the content, 
and mobilizing others to follow their views. 
The religious interpretation would root in 
their mind and manifest in their attitude even 
though after they were imprisoned for several 
years, joined deradicalization programs, 
changed their behavior, signed an agreement 
letter of loyalty to the state, and reintegrate 
into society. Ideology will always becomes the 
most intangible subject to be detected and 
measured. Therefore, gradual reintegration 
and deradicalization necessarily to conduct 
to maintain the former jihadist detainees’ 
behavior.
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